counternotions

Suppose you were the CEO of Apple in 2005 when a couple of intergalactic visitors with time-warping technology offered you this bet:

Design and manufacture a small mobile device that seamlessly combines the functionalities of a cellular phone, a web surfer, an audio/video player and a small PC, and your company will double its market cap and establish a third mass-market computing platform after Windows and Macintosh.

Would you take it?

Before you say, “Are you nuts, why wouldn’t I?” ponder just a few of the issues involved:

1. It won’t be possible to enter this market quietly or modestly and hope to grow slowly (like with Xserve a few years earlier). Yours will have to be a blockbuster entry. You are good in raising awareness and expectations around a product but that raises the consequences of failure exponentially.
2. If you fail, it would be a public fiasco of the first order, likely lopping off at least a third of your market cap and seriously eroding financial sector confidence in your company’s ability to grow and diversify beyond the Mac and the iPod businesses.
3. You will have to enter a highly-regulated, highly-contested, large-scale and capital-intensive industry of established players with deep pockets that you have never been involved with.
4. You don’t have an operating system designed for mobile devices and adopting someone else’s OS doesn’t make business or technical sense.
5. You’ll have to solve a very long list of vexing technical problems for mobile devices including power management, radio efficiency, miniaturization, storage, display, CPU utilization, multi-tasking, cloud computing, advanced graphics, data/sensory input, etc.
6. While you’re beginning to appreciate logistic and component pricing advantages on volume-based products like the iPod, you won’t have similar advantages with this device especially at the start and against players like Nokia that sells hundreds of millions of units around the world each year.
7. You may have thought dealing with music labels wasn’t much fun, now try changing handset acquisition and revenue sharing models of entrenched and oligopolistic carriers here and abroad to an extent never tried before.
8. You may think Jonathan Ive can easily design the hardware, but you’ll have to invent a stunning UI and a truly innovative interaction paradigm so that it’ll give you at least a two-to-three year competitive cushion against other players, as you will surely need it.
9. This device will likely require a bunch of proprietary service and content components (maps, email, media, games, etc) beyond your core competency, requiring lengthy negotiations and strategic partnerships.
10. In order to create a sufficiently large and attractive platform you’ll have to entice developers with an array of inexpensive development tools and create a highly-lubricated marketplace unlike any other.
11. As with the iPod, you’ll have to sell this device to a mostly Windows-oriented world.
12. In order not to be quickly marginalized, you’ll have to distribute the device in most countries around the world, even where you have little or no Mac or iPod penetration.
13. If you want to achieve iPod-scale (and you must) you’ll have to implement and operate a different, dedicated and larger sales and support network on a global basis.
14. Clearly, this is a bet-the-company move and the anti-Apple brigades are ready and armed.
15. Incidentally, you’ve recently been diagnosed with pancreatic cancer.

Often, the anything-but-Apple choir doesn’t quite appreciate the immensity of the risks Apple took with the iPhone.

So it’s 2005, will you still take the bet? Steve Jobs did:

With the March 6 unveiling of the SDK and associated announcements, Apple has greatly strengthened its iPhone value proposition to an extent that some have publicly called it game over in the mobile platform wars. Others, including professional Apple haters, AAPL shorters, nitpickers and link-baiters, had a field day trying to find holes in Apple’s new conquest plan.

Before calling Apple’s new position unassailable, let’s first see what the company uniquely brings to the battle field:

1. Design - Nearly half a decade after the introduction of the iPod and over a year after the iPhone unveiling, no other mobile player has caught up with Apple. With its unique position in the industry as the only truly vertically integrated company that can tightly couple its own hardware and software at the OS level, and bolstered by numerous patents, Apple’s industrial design and highly polished multi-touch interface have no peers.

2. Stores - Apple not only has the fastest growing and most profitable physical retail store chain in the U.S., it also offers apple.com, the most visited computer hardware site online; the iTunes Store, the best media download site that has sold over four billion songs; and now, what’s likely to be the best application discovery and download venue, the App Store. For developers that can see past ‘control’ issues, the promise of the iTunes Store-like App Store is genuinely outstanding.

3. Pricing - Unlike its mostly proprietary pre-Intel past, Apple can now leverage its high-volume iPod/Mac businesses to get favorable component prices and has been the industry leader in inventory and supply chain management. Backed with relentless product development, the company has mastered aggressive pricing strategies with its iPod line, offering the best price/value at every product segment. Apple will follow this proven pricing strategy with upcoming iPhone iterations.

4. Games - With a 163 ppi high-resolution 3.5″ screen, Core Animation, H.264 video, SQLite local storage, hardware accelerated OpenGL ES, 3-D OpenAL sound, accelerometer and multi-touch capabilities, the iPhone 2.0 has just become the most capable, nearly console-quality mobile game platform.

5. WebKit - Safari on the iPhone has already captured %71 of the mobile browser market in less than a year. While others like Adobe and Nokia also use the WebKit engine, nowhere does it shine brighter than on the iPhone with its multi-touch gestures and big screen. Apple is also about to let Safari run full-screen (like a native app), go native with JavaScript DOM traversal for huge speed gains and allow JavaScript to access some multi-touch gestures and other iPhone features.

6. Depth - Apple officially announced that it regards the iPod touch as the precursor of a mobile platform. Its multi-touch patent portfolio and gesture library bridges PCs (current Mac notebooks offer multi-touch trackpads) and mobile devices of various sizes/shapes, signaling product possibilities from iTablet to Minority Report-like form factors. Economies of scale, core design competencies like power management and miniaturization and cross-device integration opportunities will give Apple an incontrovertible advantage in product design in the post-PC era.

7. SDK - Cocoa Touch, the marriage of OS X and multi-touch UI, gives developers access to the hardware, multi-touch controls and events, accelerometer, view hierarchy, localization, alerts, web view, people/image picker, camera, etc., in a sophisticated IDE. The development tools in the new SDK, including an emulator and direct iPhone diagnostics, put it at the very top of the mobile development platform pyramid.

8. Enterprise - Under Steve Jobs Apple has never directly targeted the enterprise with any coherency or intent, believing that a frontal attack on Microsoft would be suicidal. The mobile space, however, has no such entrenched competitor that Apple believes it cannot effectively compete against. So, uncharacteristically, it has begun to openly court businesses large and small and, to the extent that it can maintain its momentum and focus, the enterprise world is a new and significant market for the company.

9. Ecosystem - From automobiles to leather cases, Apple has already created the biggest-ever ecosystem around a consumer electronics product line with the iPod. No other player in the mobile space has comparable experience in growing a billion dollar plus ecosystem, which should come in handy with a growing iPhone franchise.

10. Curatorship - Some pundits and developers see Apple-imposed restrictions in the SDK or the App Store as impediments to wider adoption of the iPhone. However, Apple has proven with Mac OS X and the iPod that it can anticipate user needs, trade featuritis for enhanced user experience and carefully distill choices to create coherent and desirable products. User satisfaction surveys consistently prove actual users love their iPhones at rates far above rival devices.

Are there any chinks in Apple’s armor? Certainly. There are real and perceived ’shortcomings’ that likely won’t change soon: dedicated enterprise sales network, physical keyboard, removable battery, etc. Others may change soon with the iPhone 2.0: video, GPS, Bluetooth A2DP, cut and paste, global search, exposed file system and so on. Some new capabilities like 3G will surely come in a few months.

What was displayed by Apple at the March 6 SDK event and the uniquely competitive factors listed above, however, should overwhelm most if not all its competitors, to echo General Colin Powell’s famous doctrine of attacking adversaries with overwhelming force to ensure victory. Apple’s arsenal is now the widest and deepest in the industry.

Who then can challenge Apple? Not Palm or Motorola (extremely weak and rudderless leadership); not RIM (no OS level hw/sw integration, little UI and very limited consumer market expertise); not Sony, Samsung or LG (no OS level hw/sw integration and limited UI expertise); not Adobe or Google (not much hardware experience). Nokia and Microsoft appear to have had the longest experience, but neither has anything like the ten factors cited above that make Apple such a well rounded competitor in this field.

As the PlaysForSure and Zune debacles have amply demonstrated Microsoft is forever saddled with the inability to choose between the OEM/partnership approach that worked on the desktop and going it alone which hasn’t in the mobile space. No doubt Microsoft will come up with its own mobile/phone hardware device and then try to balance that with its Windows Mobile licensees’ interests. The $44.6 billion question for Microsoft is, can it juggle all this with its impending Yahoo entanglement over the next three years?

Finally, how good a competitor will Nokia be? To its credit the company quickly recognized its weak points in interface development (bought Trolltech), music downloads (opened a UK-based store but it’s IE/Windows only) and online presence (recently started Ovi). Nokia is the volume leader in the mobile industry, but hasn’t really exploited that advantage, as we previously covered. It has to walk a very tight rope in order not to upset its carrier partners.

We thus see no other player that can bring as much to the table as Apple. Clearly, this is Apple’s war to lose.

Last February, with great fanfare Wal-Mart introduced its same-day-as-DVD video download service, as covered by the New York Times:

Wal-Mart Stores may have lost the online DVD rental battle, but it has no plans to lose the higher-stakes video downloading war.

Wal-Mart’s video download site will offer movies and television shows. The new service enters a field already crowded with competitors.

Today the company will introduce a partnership with all of the six major Hollywood studios — Walt Disney, Warner Brothers, Paramount, Sony, 20th Century Fox and Universal — to sell digital movies and television shows on its Web site (www.walmart.com/videodownloads), becoming the first traditional retailer to do so.

The move plunges Wal-Mart into competition with several established sites, like Amazon.com, CinemaNow and iTunes, and given the chain’s penchant for price cutting, could drive down the cost of a digital download.

In less than a year, on December 21, 2007 with the “Beta” tag still attached, the service was shuttered :

Why did the nation’s biggest retailer, whose recent slogan dress-up betrays a larger ambition beyond low prices, fail so quickly and decisively?

It never had a chance. Sure, the usual suspects — AAPL shorters and iPod/iTunes/AppleTV-killer merchants — thought this would be a “game changer” but that by now has become background noise.

There are myriad reasons why Wal-Mart has failed. The company had already closed its DVD rental site before it tried downloads. So it should have had plenty of lessons learned, especially in a fractured market with so many me-too, iTunes-killer services creating endless confusion for customers. It could also be argued that Wal-Mart just didn’t want to eat into the steady profits from its physical in-store DVD sales business.

At the end of the day, however, it comes down to one factor: Wal-Mart didn’t have competency in this business, and worse, didn’t quite figure out how to acquire it. While supply chain management and low prices are Wal-Mart’s forte, technological ingredients of digital downloads, to say nothing of the business end of branding and marketing the service, are not.

Companies that are good in one area often make the mistake of assuming that the formula that has been successful for them previously could be adapted to another market for a similar affect. Dell, for example, also fell for the very same delusion by assuming that its competencies in direct sales, supply chain management and low prices would translate into domination in digital players. Unfortunately, Dell DJ Ditty, the iPod-killer, was killed in about a year.

Wal-Mart thought that what it lacked in core competency can be outsourced. It chose HP Video Merchant Services introduced a year ago with 30 licensees:

HP Video Merchant Services provide efficient aggregation, merchandising and fulfillment of commercial video content, enabling retailers to address the growing consumer demand for greater selection of titles, improved online shopping experiences and multiple media formats…HP’s manufactured-on-demand DVD service is used to produce a DVD of any movie, TV show or other video content regardless of niche or obscurity in much smaller run quantities than would be economically viable for traditional DVD replication.

HP’s video platform prominently showcased the Wal-Mart “Success story” at its website. In an act of sheer embarrassment, the “Success story” was still available even after HP decided to shutdown the service. HP said paid video services did not perform “as expected.”

Wal-Mart relied on HP for the download service, the six major movie studios for the content, Microsoft for the IE web browser and DRM, and hardly anyone for branding, marketing or customer service. Why the world’s largest retailer thought this was a winning formula is still a mystery, one that applies to a frightening number of companies that prove to be all too ignorant, arrogant or incompetent.

In a frenzy to catch up with Apple, the industry hasn’t learned much from the PlaysForSure debacle by watching Microsoft abandon its own DRM and introduce Zune with a new and incompatible system to compete directly against its erstwhile digital music “partners.” In another instance of mortgaging success to others’ willingness or ability to innovate, AOL recently moved its struggling video service to Amazon Unbox which in turn is based on Microsoft’s PlaysForSure.

The irony here is that Wal-Mart relied on HP that relied on Microsoft and AOL relies on Amazon that relies on Microsoft which itself no longer relies on its own PlaysForSure. When a core component of a product or service depends on the rate of innovation of another party over which you have no control or influence, it’s time to rethink strategy. It’s also time to ask yourself, twice or thrice removed from core competency, should you really be in such a business?

UPDATE: It turns out Wal-Mart actually thought about the impending implosion of their download service and fingered the culprit. From an interview last month in the New York Times, Raul Vazquez, chief executive of Wal-Mart.com:

This has been in beta. We want to understand what the customers want. And I think what we learned is that the initial experience of buying and downloading content needs to be better. We thought it was going to be easier for the customer to understand.

Yes, it’s the customer’s fault.

In Why enterprise software isn’t sexy Robert Scoble writes about Bill Gates’ frustration with the lack of coverage given by blogs and reporters to enterprise software:

Even in the Wall Street Journal, and you think, oh, this is the paper they’re going to tell me about business computing; no, it’s all about consumer computing.

In enterprises all over the world, there must be millions of programmers writing enterprise software and untold others interacting with them. However, if actually understanding the scope and depth of enterprise software were to be a requirement for blogging about the subject, there would be a frighteningly miniscule fraction qualified to do so. Anyone who hasn’t been around a decade or so would be immediately ineligible, for lacking all important historical perspective if nothing else.

In turn, those who have been around often expediently erect walls of authority and accuse others of being unable to understand the complexity of creating and maintaining enterprise software.

There’s of course plenty of confusion about what’s usable, useful and sexy, but those who defend what amounts to inherent complexity of enterprise software support an underlying assumption: it’s acceptable that people who are daily exposed to high interface and interaction values inherent in TV, movies, advertising, magazines and gadgets in the consumer sphere are somehow rendered incapable of expecting and appreciating the same within the walls of the enterprise from 9 to 5.

This is understandable in that while consumer consumption is about personal choice, enterprise workers almost never get to choose or, just as importantly, personally pay for the software they use. If they did, we surely would not have had, for example, ghastly “enterprise-grade” mobile device software that has been “servicing” the industry for over a decade…until the birth of the iPhone.

It’s a daily spectacle to watch iPhone toting CEOs telling their IT departments to make their phone work with their company’s enterprise systems. The only ones who may not appreciate the irony in the world’s biggest maker of business management software introducing SAP CRM 2007 to run on the iPhone – the sexiest consumer device around – are in fact the defenders of enterprise legacy. SAP senior vice president Bob Stutz:

“The iPhone has become such a popular thing…Everybody wants the ease of use of the iPhone.”

The New York Times quotes Stutz saying that “SAP decided to introduce the iPhone software ahead of programs for other devices at the request of its sales people, saying they prefer using iPhones to the other devices.”

We know what’s sexy in the consumer world. I have no doubt that given half a chance consumers who go to work from 9 to 5 in the enterprise and those who access enterprise software from outside would want radically better and sexy software just as well.

Instead, this is what they get:

• Legacy mainframe apps whose caretakers are unwilling or unable to abstract the UI through a rich and flexible web interface to hide complexity, what some call “incremental SOA,” aren’t sexy.
• Strategists who regard scalability as mere capacity enhancement without understanding who uses their software and how aren’t sexy.
• Those who don’t understand that iTunes Store, Google or Amazon are some of the largest enterprise applications on the planet despite supporting consumer-level access aren’t sexy.
• Enterprises who compel users to download multi-megabyte, single-OS, thick-client software for tasks that even the iPhone’s web browser could handle without much fuss aren’t sexy.
• Those who advocated running the enterprise through the desktop by devaluing the web browser for half a decade, even if they admit it now, aren’t sexy.
• Businesses that still think that subjecting their customers to endless paper and digital form filling is a sexy form of information gathering and circulation aren’t sexy.
• Financial enterprises that believe in creating hyper-efficient, but siloed loan origination systems without tightly coupling them to risk analysis systems, thereby writing off over $50 billion industrywide aren’t sexy.
• Software architects who still have their business logic scattered all over UI objects, web pages and stored procedures aren’t sexy.
• Those OS architects who neglected security at the altar of features and gave several hundred million users a decade-long agita aren’t sexy.
• Those who believe the best way to bring “business intelligence” to executives and masses alike is through uninformative 3D dashboard gadgetry aren’t sexy.
• Those who think UIs to end-points of enterprise service systems can be done by Soviet-era Bulgarian freight train engineers aren’t sexy.
• Those who have convinced themselves that the user interface isn’t the application aren’t sexy.

So yes, Bill Gates is absolutely right that we all should pay far more attention to enterprise software. Only then will we learn just how much work is needed to strip away layers of mindless complexity in Microsoft’s own SharePoint, BizTalk and others, to finally render them…sexy.

Punching In: The Unauthorized Adventures of a Front-Line Employee is Alex Frankel’s just-released account of front-line jobs he had at companies like Gap, Starbucks, UPS and Apple during a two-year project.

Earlier in Apple Store strategy: “Position, permission, probe”, we briefly considered his training and job experience at an Apple Store. Today we ask Alex to expand specifically on his Apple Store insights in an exclusive interview:

Since you’ve been a long-time “Apple fan” and Mac user, did you always know that Apple would be one of the companies in your project?

No, I went into the project with a fairly open plan about what companies I would apply for and hopefully work for. I took into account a few things: the popular business press, business school case studies, lists of great companies to work, and my own experiences as a customer. I had a list of about twenty target companies and then timing and applications determined where I ended up actually working.

You say that Apple turns away 90% of the applicants. Is that why you thought it would be harder to get a job at an Apple Store?

That was a number I had seen in a number of business articles and it certainly seemed to be a lot higher than other companies. Apple Stores were, and are, hot as retail jobs go and I applied at a few stores before finally landing the job I ended up with at an Apple Store in a mall in San Francisco. There are many job descriptions in any given Apple Store and to get many of them — Genius, Creative, etc. — you need a set of skills that I did not possess.

Did you know that Apple prefers “enthusiasts and true believers” over sales experience before you got the job?

Before I applied for the job I was not clear about what Apple was looking for in applicants. During the course of my first interview, however, it became clear to me that such an interest was something that was desired and so I made sure to communicate that I had had a series of Apple computers and iPods and made use of programs like Final Cut and Safari.

Were all Apple Store workers “Apple fans” before they got there? Did you come across anyone who was there simply as a stepping stone in a more generic sales career or was the “Apple way” central in their decision? Was there strong self-selection based on real or perceived Apple culture?

I did not meet anyone in the store where I worked who seemed interested in a career in retail per se. The common set of interests that united the forty or so employees in the store were knowledge of and interest in Apple products. Most of my colleagues simply used Macs and associated programs like Garage Band and Motion and had found a job that allowed them to share their knowledge and interest with customers.

I think you imply that many of the Store employees were transient, mostly students from nearby schools. Was there a distinct group of employees for whom this was perhaps their first job of what would be a long career at Apple? Do you know if there’s a steady stream of transition from the retail stores to jobs at the mothership?

I don’t know whether many retail store employees end up in Cupertino, but I doubt it. I got the sense that they are two fairly different orbits. Some of my colleagues did talk about going to Cupertino for training and even for one of the Friday afternoon beer rallies, but that had to do with our proximity to Silicon Valley more than anything else I think.

You say, “The Apple Store was an obvious last stop in my expedition into the workplace.” Did you decide this at the onset of the project or at the end?

That was something I decided when I was at the Apple Store. Having finally arrived at a workplace where I felt somewhat at home and where I felt I could be myself in a way not like other workplaces, I decided I had traveled through a broad enough cross section of workplaces and could move on to write about my experiences.

You say that “The training at Apple which lasted 40 hours, was by far the highest quality of on-the-job learning that I was exposed to on my journey.” Apple wanted customers to be like “season ticket holders” and thus the Store workers more like “recruiters” than salespeople. Did you get a sense in the training that Apple’s corporate mission outlook was more like 10-15 years than, say, 2-3 years? A “corporate sense of patience” so to speak?

If you mean that the goals of the company are more patient than others, yes, there did seem to be some evidence for that in our training. Apple is well aware of its small lock on the overall computer marketplace (around five percent I think) and knows that a big part of the mission for its stores is to double that number. That was the message on the day Apple launched its first store.

I noticed that you underlined the “permission” aspect of engaging the customer into revealing their intent, as the salespeople used the “Would it be alright if I ask you…” phrase quite a bit. Was that specifically taught during training? Do customers ever deny that permission request?

Yes, the notion of asking customers for their permission to ask them more questions is a critical part of the Apple Store employee approach and taught throughout Apple Store training. I never experienced any customers who denied the request–I think that would be fairly rare. Asking someone “Is it alright if I ask you about your computer needs” is a very formal way of saying, essentially, “Is it alright if I start the sales process in a way that is agreeable to you?”

You say that salespeople often said “I don’t know; let’s find out,” thereby engaging the customer in a co-learning process, which Apple called “return to learning” (R2L). Was R2L encouraged or was it considered a last-resort reaction? Did customers actually appreciate this or you think they would have wanted a quick answer to their inquiry?

Though it was not taught as such, I think in some ways this R2L was indeed a last resort. Most customers are in a rush and don’t have time to stick around and learn more, or spend time as the salesperson learns more. A more typical approach would be to find a colleague who is more versed in a particular technology and able to weigh in on the question a customer has.

I was recently at the Stamford, CT Apple Store that was barely navigable from all the back-to-school traffic. The store manager there said to me that in that mall despite its comparatively minuscule size Apple had become de facto “anchor store,” which is usually a large chain like Macy’s that draws customers into the mall. Did you notice a lot of people simply walking into the Apple Store through mall traffic rather than any specific product need?

No doubt about it, the Apple Stores have become destinations for many shoppers, or simply places to kill time. If you look around at any large Apple Store, many of the people in them are doing things online that have nothing to do with buying a computer. They may be testing out programs, but more likely they are checking their email or surfing the web. As a culture, we are very focused these days on electornic communication and entertainment and celebrity culture and because they afford interaction with online content, Apple Stores are a place outside our homes and offices where we can easily and enjoyably tap into this stuff.

Could you tell apart non-Mac users easily? Were you taught to identify them upfront and approach them differently in any significant way?

During the training that I participated in there was no particular focus on identifying non-Mac users. This may be a part of training these days, I am not sure. This type of information would definitely surface during your initial interaction with a customer, however.

You say Apple training stressed that salespeople were the “first touch point” for customers and didn’t “have a second chance to make a first impression.” Did non-Mac users or Apple fans expect more in the Store?

I don’t think so.

You compared yourself to “Leon, the Naked Man” who was more knowledgeable both about Apple products and selling in general, with a good sales record. Do customers really want to be “informed” rather than “sold”? Is that a winning sales strategy? Did you come across any customers taken aback by the absence of hard-selling?

I think across the board customers appreciate the sharing of information versus selling of products. On a few occasions I did have customers ask whether I was being paid on commission (I was not) so that they might seek me out the next time they were in. They had felt, perhaps, that the amount of information I had provided was very helpful and they wanted to reward me later or at least acknowledge that I had helped them.

You say many customers come to the Apple Store already predisposed to buy. Do you think without that predisposition you’d still have as successful a retail chain as the Stores have become? Was it easy to detect how powerful the out-of-store positioning through Apple’s marketing and brand building is?

I think that predisposition to buy which Apple Store customers bring to the stores is critical to their success and without it the entire Apple Store experience would indeed be different. I found many people coming in for a new computer to replace their existing Apple machine, so they were clearly ready to buy and stick with the brand. That said, there were certainly people in the stores who did not own any Apple products but came in because they had heard the buzz about the iPod. Today I am sure iPhones bring in a similar population of new-to-Apple customers.

Marco, the floor manager, says, “At Apple, design supersedes everything, and I mean everything.” Even as a designer I haven’t noticed this, but are there really “nearly invisible lines on the butcher block display tables” for keyboards and computers to line up?

Marco was referring to design at Apple in the broad sense — including the industrial design of the products as well as the architecture and environmental design of the stores. And yes, if you look closely at the wood grain of the butcher block counters you will see faint lines that are used to properly position the various pieces–mouses, cables, computers. Watch closely and you will see people in the stores moving things around to their “right” spot after customers use them and move them around.

I don’t know that he has the habit of doing this, but if Steve Jobs had walked into your Apple Store and asked you a question, what would you have preferred it to be? And what would you ask Jobs today if you had a chance?

I have a feeling Jobs doesn’t do a lot of schmoozing with Apple Store employees, but if he had come into the store and struck up a conversation with me I would have liked him to ask me something like “What’s your favorite Apple product and why?” or “Tell me about a specific Apple-oriented experience you have had.” I would have probably told him about the excitement I had using the iPod a few years back when I purchased the first generation unit and immediately found how intuitive the user interface was and how great it was to go digital and sell all my CDs. On the flipside, I would ask him something like “Steve, where is Apple going to be in a decade and what products are we, as customers, going to be using on a daily basis?”

Thank you Alex.

Frankel’s impressions on Apple Stores were outlined earlier here:
Apple Store strategy: “Position, permission, probe”